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INTRODUCTION
Employment is "the key to independence."' For the mentally
ill, however, the right to employment2 has been a conditional one.
Like all citizens, the mentally ill have a legitimate need and a right
to be productive, working members of society.' By inversely
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I John W. Parry, Employment Under the ADA: A National Perspective, 15 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 525, 525 (1991) (discussing the symbolic value of
employment).
2 By speaking of a person's right to be a productive and working member of
society, I do not mean to suggest a constitutional liberty interest. To be sure, the
Constitution defines liberty broadly enough to guarantee freedom of contract and
freedom to pursue an occupation, see Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923);
however, the United States Supreme Court has never held that the Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest creates a constitutional right to have ajob. But see Board
of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 589 (1972) (Marshall,J., dissenting) ("[L]iberty to
work.., is the 'very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity' secured by the
Fourteenth Amendment." (quotingTruax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915))). Rather,
the purpose of mentioning this "right to work" is to introduce a major premise
underlying this Comment that the right to be a productive member of society "goes
to the very heart of our way of life." Linehan v. Waterfront Comm., 347 U.S. 439,
441 (1954) (Douglas,J., dissenting). Advocates for the mentally disabled, however,
do purport to pursue the "right to ... work where one chooses" as a legal goal.
MENTAL DISABILITY LAW: A PRIMER at i (Commission on the Mentally Disabled,
American Bar Ass'n ed., 1984).
- It is widely recognized that the significance of employment is both practical and
symbolic; the ability to work results not only in income but also in a sense of
community participation and self-worth. See Seymour R. Kaplan, Foreword to
BERTRAMJ. BLACK, WORK AND MENTAL ILLNESS: TRANSITIONS TO EMPLOYMENT at ix,
ix-x (1988); Laura L. Mancuso, Reasonable Accommodation for Workers with Psychiatric
Disabilities, 14 PSYCHOSOCIAL REHABILITATION J. 3, 3 (1990). Some scholars only
grudgingly acknowledge the legitimate place of the mentally ill in society. See
THOMAS SZASZ, CRUEL COMPASSION: PSYCHIATRIC CONTROL OF SOCIETY'S UNWANTED
137 (1994) (calling the mentally ill "dependents" and stating that, although they "are
human beings and belong in and to society[,] ... it is absurd to value them more
highly than the productive members of society").
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correlating productivity with disability,4 however, society has
long stigmatized mentally ill individuals and thwarted their
search or acceptance and assimilation into regular society. In the
employment arena, this stigma often crosses the line into actual
discrimination.
On July 26, 1990, this country took a major step toward
eliminating such discrimination when President Bush signed into
law the Americans with Disabilities Act (the "ADA" or the "Act").5
This landmark enactment marked the bestowment of a "breathtak-
ing promise for people with mental disabilities."6 Congress noted:
Martin Luther King had a dream. We have a vision. Dr. King
dreamed of an America "where a person is judged not by the color
of his skin, but by the content of his character." ADA's vision is
of an America where persons are judged by their abilities and not
on the basis of their disabilities.
7
4 See MARTIN ROTH &JEROME KROLL, THE REALITY OF MENTAL ILLNESS 23 (1986)
(noting that our society "defines the productive as 'well' and the unproductive as
'sick'"); cf SZASZ, supra note 3, at xiii n.* (arguing that "our economic magnanimity
toward able-bodied dependents, especially those labeled mentally ill, is . . .
counterproductive").
' Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (Supp. V
1993). Congress implemented the ADA incrementally. In 1992, the ADA reached
only employers with 25 or more employees; the Act took full effect onJuly 26, 1994,
governing any employer with 15 or more employees. See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(5)(A); see
also infra note 69 (noting that the application of the ADA was effectuated in two
stages).
6 Bonnie Milstein et al., The Americans with Disabilities Act: A Breathtaking Promise
for People with Mental Disabilities, 24 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1240 (1991). The
importance of this legislation is exemplified by the "emotion-filled ceremony" which
celebrated its passage. "Let the shameful wall of exclusion finally come tumbling
down," stated President Bush as he signed the ADA into law in front of lobbying
groups, disabled-persons rights advocates, and "row upon row of disabled Americans
cheering and sometimes weeping with happiness." Ann Devroy, In Emotion-Filled
Ceremony, Bush Signs Rights LawforAmerica's Disabled, WASH. POST, July 27, 1990, at
A18. President Bush went on to describe the ADA as "the world's first comprehen-
sive declaration of equality for people with disabilities." Bush Signs Disabilities Act at
White House Ceremony, BNA WASH. INSIDER, July 27, 1990, available in LEXIS, News
Library, Arcnws File. Moreover, federal legislators have called the ADA the
"Emancipation Proclamation" for disabled persons, see 135 CONG. REC. S4984 (daily
ed. May 9, 1989) (statement of Sen. Harkin), and "the most sweeping piece of civil
rights legislation since the Civil War era." 135 CONG. REC. 14,198-04 (1989)
(statement of Sen. Hatch).
7 HOUSE COMM. ON EDUC. AND LABOR, AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT OF
1990, H.R. REP. No. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 48 (1990) (statement of
Sandra (Sandy) S. Parrino, head of the National Council on Disability), reprinted in
1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 267, 330 [hereinafter HOUSE EDUC. AND LABOR REPORT]. This
report is the primary source of legislative history leading up to Title I (the
employment provision) of the Americans with Disabilities Act.
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In short, the ADA guarantees persons with disabilities equal
access to societal civil rights.' The Act simultaneously sets up a
prohibition against discrimination and an obligation to accommo-
date reasonably persons with physical and mental impairments.9
'The ADA protects these rights in five titles: employment (Title I), public
transportation and other state and local government services (Title II), public
accommodations (Title III), telecommunications (Title IV), and miscellaneous
provisions (Title V). This Comment focuses exclusively on Title I. For a more
complete and general overview of the Act in its entirety, see THE AMERICANS WIH
DISABILITIES ACT: A PRACTICAL AND LEGAL GUIDE TO IMPACT, ENFORCEMENT, AND
COMPLIANCE (Bureau of Nat'l Affairs ed., 1990) (reviewing the Act's provisions). The
ADA complements the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 ("FHAA"), 42 U.S.C.
§§ 3602, 3604-3631 (1988), which prohibits discriminatory housing practices based
on disability. See GARY S. MARX & GARY G. GOLDBERGER, DISABILITY LAW
COMPLIANCE MANUAL at S8-1 to S8-13 (Cumulative Supp. 1995) (outlining several
sections of the FHAA); Bonnie Milstein et al., The Fair Housing Amendments Act of
1988: What It Means for People with Mental Disabilities, 23 CLEARINGHOUSE REv. 128,
128-30 (1989) (outlining the purposes of the FHAA).
' In discussing mental impairments, it is important to distinguish between the
terms "mental disability" and "mental illness," both of which the ADA covers.
Although these terms are often used interchangeably to refer to diseases of the mind,
in reality they define different mental conditions. This Comment makes every effort
not to confuse or conflate these clinical definitions. "Mental disability" refers to
neurological impairments due to developmental and organic disorders (for example,
cerebral palsy and brain injury). See DEBORAH ZUCKERMAN ET AL., THE ADA AND
PEOPLE WITH MENTAL ILLNESS: A RESOURCE MANUAL FOR EMPLOYERS 1 (1993). By
contrast, "mental illness" includes thought, mood, and anxiety disorders (for example,
schizophrenia, depressive disorders, paranoias and anxiety disorders, and obsessive-
compulsive disorder). See id. at 7. Mental illness is additionally distinguishable by its
predominate treatment: the use of psychotropic medication. See id. at 11.
Psychotropic medication, characteristically used to treat the mentally ill, see infra note
47 and accompanying text, is central to this Comment's ultimate proposal.
The Supreme Court has recently acknowledged the distinction between mental
retardation and mental illness. See Heller v. Doe, 113 S. Ct. 2637, 2649-50 (1993)
(upholding a Kentucky statute which required a higher standard of proof for the
involuntary commitment of the mentally ill than for the mentally retarded). In fact,
the Court noted that the differentiation between mental illness and mental
retardation is a "commonsense distinction ... [that] continues to the present day."
Id. at 2646; see also Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295,
1298 (E.D. Pa. 1977), affd in part and rev'd in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), cert.
granted, 447 U.S. 904 (1980) (noting that mental "[r]etardation is wholly distinct from
mental illness" since it is a learning impairment rather than "a disease which can be
cured through drugs or treatment"). These distinctions emphasize the unique nature
of mental illness and rely at least in part on the characteristic use of psychotropic
medication to treat the mentally ill. See infra part I.B.3 (arguing that mental illness
is sufficiently different from other types of disability to warrant additional safeguards
against employment discrimination).
In discussing mental illness, courts are guided by the definitions of the AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS
(4th ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV], a diagnostic reference offered by the American
Psychiatric Association ("APA"). See, e.g., Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2643 (relying on a
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Mental impairments, because of their hidden and often misunder-
stood nature, present special challenges for the successful imple-
mentation of the ADA. In striving toward its goal of inclusion, the
ADA faces the difficulty of a long history of exclusion with regard
to the mentally impaired."0 Furthermore, the ADA's emphasis on
physical disability" has led many to construe the Act to provide
more direct protection to persons with physical disabilities,
suggesting that the Act may be unfairly and unequally applied to
persons with mental illness.
12
previous edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders for
diagnostic definitions). Legislative history reveals that the drafters of the ADA
intended that this APA reference be relied upon in defining mental illness. See 135
CONG. REC. Sl1,174 (daily ed. Sept. 14, 1989) ("A private entity that wishes to know
what the [ADA) might mean with respect to mental impairments would do well to
turn to DSM-III-R [now revised by DSM-IV] ... .") (statement of Sen. Armstrong).
This Comment focuses on "mental illness," which is included in the ADA's
"mental impairment" category, and is thus considered a disability under the ADA;
therefore, mental disabilities, current drug/psychoactive substance use, alcoholism,
learning disabilities, and epilepsy fall outside the scope of the present inquiry. For
discussions of the ADA's application to these types of disabilities, see generally Reese
J. Henderson,Jr., Addiction As Disability: The Protection of Alcoholics and Drug Addicts
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990,44 VAND. L. REV. 713 (1991); Loretta
K. Haggard, Note, Reasonable Accommodation of Individuals with Mental Disabilities and
Psychoactive Substance Use Disorders Under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act,
43 WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 343 (1993).
1 See Gary B. Melton & Ellen G. Garrison, Fear, Prejudice, and Neglect: Discrimi-
nation Against Mentally Disabled Persons, 42 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 1007, 1007 (arguing
that, historically, the law has provided inadequate protection for the mentally disabled
and has even directly discriminated against them); Judith Rabkin, Public Attitudes
Toward Mental Illness: A Review of the Literature, SCHIZOPHRENIA BULL., Fall 1974, at
9, 19 (recognizing a stigma that prevents the full inclusion of the mentally ill in
society and commenting that "[t]oday, as in times past, when people encounter the
description or presence of someone who has been labeled mentally ill, they are not
pleased to meet him"); Ren~e Ravid, Disclosure of Mental Illness to Employers: Legal
Recourses and Ramifications, 20J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 85, 85 (1992) (calling employment
discrimination against the mentally ill a "legacy ... of both private and public
employers").
" The ADA regulations and the interpretive guidelines issued by the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), see infra note 72 and accompanying
text, illustrate the provisions of the Act largely with examples of physical disability.
For example, the ADA provides disabled persons with the right to auxiliary aids and
services. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1) (Supp. V 1993). The statute expressly contem-
plates only the auxiliary needs of the visually and hearing impaired, however, and the
EEOC interpretation of this provision leaves it unclear how those with mental
impairments might benefit from this right. See Mental and Physical Disabilities Are
Treated Differently UnderADA, 12 MENTAL HEALTH L. REP. 33, 33 (1994) [hereinafter
Disabilities Treated Differently]; see also Employers Encounter Difficulties in Applying ADA
to Mentally Ill, 12 MENTAL HEALTH L. REP. 57, 57 (1994) [hereinafter Employers
Encounter Difficulties] (noting that the costs of mental disabilities have been ignored).
12 See Disabilities Treated Differently, supra note 11, at 33 (noting that "unequal
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This Comment looks at the employment challenges facing the
mentally ill under the ADA and argues that the unique nature of
mental illness, together with the large success of treatment through
medication, warrants additional safeguards for the mentally ill
through ADA protection. Part I describes the barriers to employ-
ment which face the mentally ill and establishes the unique position
of such individuals in the employment setting. Part II introduces
the ADA and outlines the mechanics of Title I, the ADA's employ-
ment provision. Part III details one ADA employer defense, the
direct threat qualification (or "safety defense"), which has broad
application to the mentally ill, and evaluates the current
interpretations of the defense. Given the unique nature of the
mental-illness disability, Part III argues that the safety defense may
unfairly be used against persons with mental illness; therefore,
additional safeguards are needed to assure that the ADA's protec-
tion extends to the mentally ill. Part IV proposes one such
safeguard: when an employer attempts to invoke the safety defense
against a mentally ill employee, the potentially mitigating impact of
psychotropic medication on the illness must be considered.
Specifically, this Comment suggests that this safeguard be imple-
mented as an additional factor in the EEOC's current direct threat
analysis. This Comment concludes with a discussion of the
applications and implications of adding the use of psychotropic
medication to the direct threat analysis.
benefit determinations may be due to differing interpretations of mental and physical
disabilities"); Stephan Haimowitz, Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990: Its
Signi ficancefor Persons with Mental Illness, 42 HosP. & COMMUNITY PSYCHIATRY 23, 23
(1991) (stating that the "impact of the [A]ct may not be as great" for people with
mental illness); infra note 99 (noting that one senator even proposed an amendment
that would exclude all persons diagnosed with psychiatric disorders covered by the
APA's Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders from the ADA's protection);
see also Louis Pechman, Coping with Mental Disabilities in the Workplace, N.Y. STATE B.
J.,July-Aug. 1995, at 22, 22 ("Mental disabilities are given equal billing with physical
disabilities in the [ADA], but you wouldn't know that by looking at the ADA's
legislative history."). For instance, during one floor debate on the ADA, a senator
remarked:
While the committee report gives examples of clear-cut accommodations for
the [physically] disabled, it studiously avoids the more bizarre accommoda-
tion requirements imposed by the bill. What are employers expected to do
to accommodate alcoholics, the mentally retarded, or persons with neurotic
or psychotic disorders? This Senator has no idea, and I doubt that other
Senators do either.
135 CONG. REC. S10,783 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989) (statement of Sen. Humphrey).
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I. MENTAL ILLNESS AND EMPLOYMENT
A. Mental Illness As a Barrier to Employment
Today, it is estimated that 1.5 million Americans have some
form of severe, persistent, disabling mental illness that interferes
with daily functioning. 13 Moreover, up to twenty percent of the
U.S. population suffers from a diagnosable psychiatric disorder.'
4
Depressive disorders, 15 anxiety disorders, 16 and schizophrenia 17 are
15 SeeJanet O'Keeffe, Disability, Discrimination, and the Americans with Disabilities
Act, in IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT FOR PSYCHOLOGY 1,
2 (Susanne M. Bruyire & Janet O'Keeffe eds., 1994).
14 See David A. Larson, Mental Impairments and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973,48 LA.
L. REv. 841, 846 (1988).
15 Depressive disorders are characterized by periods of sadness and intense grief
severe enough to affect daily functioning. See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 64.
Four common diagnoses include major (unipolar) depression, manic-depressive
(bipolar) disorder, dysthymia, and seasonal affective disorder. See id. Symptoms of
depressive disorders include feelings ofworthlessness or helplessness, persistent and
intense sadness, pessimism, social withdrawal, inappropriate guilt, recurrent thoughts
of suicide, marked personality change, problems with sleeping or excessive fatigue,
irregular eating patterns, difficulty concentrating, restlessness, and anger out of
proportion to the situation. See id. at 64-65. Bipolar disorder differs from the other
three in that the individual experiences manic episodes ("highs") in addition to
depression ("lows"). See id. at 65. Just as depression is more than a bad mood, these
manic episodes are not simply a good mood or a break in the depression. See id.
Rather, mania is a euphoric state which may lead the individual to experience rushes
of ideas or thoughts, grandiose notions, extreme distractibility, abundant energy,
increased risk-taking, rapid talking or fidgeting, and a tendency to act irrationally and
to overlook harmful or painful consequences of behavior. See id. For clinical
definitions of these disorders, see DSM-IV, supra note 9.
16 Examples of anxiety disorders are phobias, panic disorder, obsessive-compulsive
disorder ("OCD"), and post-traumatic stress disorder. See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra
note 9, at 60. Phobia, the most common anxiety disorder, is an irrational, persistent,
and excessive fear in response to an object or situation. See id. Social phobia (fear
of situations that expose a person to another's judgment) and agoraphobia (fear of
being in situations from which escape might be embarrassing or difficult) present
serious ramifications in the workplace. See id. at 60-61. OCD, characterized by
compulsions and obsessions (that is, repeated washing of hands) consumes significant
time and energy in one's day and interferes with one's daily schedule. See id. at 62.
Anxiety disorders result in symptoms such as panic attacks, cardiac distress, difficulty
breathing, loss of bladder control, paralyzing fear, nausea, or intrusive thoughts or
impulses. See id. at 60-63. For clinical definitions of these disorders, see DSM-IV,
supra note 9. For a discussion of the ADA's treatment of phobias, seeJohn M. Casey,
Comment, From Agoraphobia to Xenophobia: Phobias and Other Anxiety Disorders Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 17 U. PUGET SOUND L. REV. 381 (1994).
17 Schizophrenia is a highly complex disorder resulting in disassociation or
fragmentation of ideas that leads to delusions, hallucinations, notions of grandeur,
and thought disorders. See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 66-67. These
manifestations contribute to social withdrawal or isolation, inability to communicate
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the most prevalent forms of mental illness."t In addition to these
specific afflictions, persons with mental illness suffer from low self-
esteem, feelings of inadequacy, social anxiety, stigma, and self-
blame. 19
These statistics carry broad implications for America's work-
force. As the first symptoms of mental illness frequently surface
between the ages of fifteen and twenty-five-years generally reserved
for substantial educational and/or vocational trainingR--the unem-
ployment rate for the mentally ill has been measured to be as high
as seventy percent.21 Although each mentally ill individual faces
unique challenges, the common difficulties faced by the mentally ill
in the workplace include: functional difficulties, problems socializ-
ing, limited stamina, irregular attendance, maladaptive coping
mechanisms for stress, heightened anxiety, difficulty accepting
feedback, distractibility, fear of relapse, stress due to fear of stigma
resulting from disclosure of the illness, physical side effects of
medication, 22 and an inability to respond to change.
23
with others, impairment in personal hygiene and grooming, and inappropriate affect.
See id. at 67. Schizophrenia should not be confused with multiple personality
disorder, which is a wholly separate and rare disorder. See id. at 66. For clinical
definitions of schizophrenia, see DSM-IV, supra note 9.
'8 See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 9. Fifteen percent of all persons suffer
from some form of severe depression during their lifetime. See Larson, supra note
14, at 846. Six percent will experience major depression. See ZUCKERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 64. Five to ten percent suffer an affective disorder, and five to ten
percent are afflicted with severe personality disorder; more than five percent develop
generalized anxiety. See Larson, supra note 14, at 846. Nearly two percent of adults
have schizophrenia. See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 66. Moreover, mental
illness frequently accompanies substance abuse. See id. at 13-14 (referring to a
National Institute of Mental Health study that found that 30% of mentally ill adults
have also had a diagnosable drug and/or alcohol abuse disorder and that 53% of
adults with a substance abuse disorder have had at least one mental illness).
9 See Adrienne Asch, The Experience of a Disability: A Challenge for Psychology, 39
AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 529,531-32 (1984) (suggesting that handicaps "arouse anxiety" in
both handicapped and non-handicapped people).
2o See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 8 (asserting that mental illness may well
result in individuals missing "substantial portions of traditional educational or
vocational training").
21 See H. Keith Massel et al., Evaluating the Capacity to Work of the Mentally Ill, 53
PSYCHIATRY 31, 31 (1990); see also E. Sally Rogers et al., Psychiatric Rehabilitation As
the Preferred Response to the Needs of Individuals with Severe Psychiatric Disability, 33
REHABILITATION PSYCHOL. 5, 8 (1988) (estimating that "no more than 20% to 30% of
individuals with psychiatric disability are competitively employed").
' See infra notes 159-62 and accompanying text (discussing the side effects of
medication).
2 See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 12-13 (considering each of these
difficulties in turn); see also Carroll M. Brodsky, Factors Influencing Work-Related
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These problems are magnified by the fact that the mentally ill
are considered potentially dangerous in the workplace, and indeed
in many other contexts as well.24 The inherently subjective nature
of mental illness adds to the difficulty of distinguishing
misperceptions from reality in the workplace.25 Despite empirical
evidence that mental illness is not a predictor of violence,
26
the media-driven image of the dangerous lunatic persists.2 This
image, combined with a presumption of incompetence, has
prompted a generally skeptical attitude toward hiring the men-
tally ill.
28
Disability, in PSYCHIATRIC DISABILITY: CLINICAL, LEGAL, AND ADMINISTRATIVE
DIMENSIONS 49, 52-57 (Arthur T. Meyerson & Theodora Fine eds., 1987) (describing
some of these difficulties in detail).
24 See SZASZ, supra note 3, at xii (recognizing the common assumption that persons
who "are mentally ill... are a danger to themselves and others"). Szasz continues:
Bedlam is now everywhere, making our streets and parks both ugly and
unsafe. Ugly because we tolerate unacceptable behavior by persons so long
as, dejure, they are classified as mental patients; and unsafe because many
of these individuals engage in de facto aggression, depriving others of
property, liberty, and even life.
Id. at 168.
25 See EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMM'N, A TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL OF THE EMPLOYMENT PROVISIONS (TITLE I) OF THE AMERICANS WITH
DISABILITIES ACT at 111-2 (Jan. 1992) [hereinafter EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE
MANUAL] (noting that "[m]any [persons with disabilities] are excluded [from the
workplace] only by barriers in other people's minds; these include unfounded fears,
stereotypes, presumptions, and misconceptions about job performance, safety,
absenteeism, costs, or acceptance by coworkers and customers").
2' Although "future violence by a mental patient cannot be reliably predicted," the
dangerousness of the mentally ill, to themselves or others, is typically overpredicted.
ELIO MAGGIO, THE PSYCHIATRY-LAW DILEMMA: MENTAL HEALTH VERSUS HUMAN
RIGHTS 18 (1981). In fact, studies have indicated that a person with a mental illness
may actually be less dangerous than a member of the normal population. See id.; see
also ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 9 (stating that "most people with mental
illness are neither dangerous nor unpredictable"). The studies indicating that the
mentally ill are less violent than the "normal" population, however, were made at a
time when "prolonged hospitalization ... may have prevented investigations from
detecting violent behavior." MAGGIO, supra, at 18. More recent studies, made at a
time when the mentally ill were being deinstitutionalized, have found that "the
psychiatric patient is, indeed, more prone to violence than the normal individual."
Id. at 19. It is not established, however, whether these conclusions may be
generalized to include noninstitutionalized, mainstream mentally ill who are
functioning well in society.2 7 See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 9.
21 Common myths and misconceptions held by employers include the beliefs that
the turnover rate for disabled employees is high, that accommodations for disabled
persons are unduly expensive, that disabled individuals do not contribute to
productivity in the workplace, and that the presence of disabled employees makes
customers and clients feel uncomfortable. See Peter D. Blanck, The Emerging Work
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Historically, mental impairment was seen as symbolic
punishment for moral transgressions:29 "[M]ental illness has been
historically associated with sin, evil, God's punishment, crime,
and demons.""0 Even legal study reveals a history tainted with
labels and characterized by intolerance and disdain for the mentally
ill." The result is that the mentally ill, perceived as prisoners
of their own deficient minds, have been lowered to the level of
"third-class citizens" by the presumption that they are dependent
and incompetent.3 2 Mental illness is still greeted with skepticism
by many, and the concept of coupling mental illness with indepen-
dence remains unthinkable."3 "Today, people find it intolerable to
witness a person talking to himself, depressed, contemplating
suicide. The public wants to be spared this spectacle." 34 It is
faced with these deeply rooted perceptions, and at the risk of
creating a "spectacle," that the mentally ill enter the employment
market.
B. Mental Illness As Distinct from Other Disabilities
1. Mental Illness Differs from Physical Disability
Given the unique nature of the disability, it is not surprising that
mental illness presents special challenges in the workplace. Its main
counterpart, physical disability, may be distinguished on several
grounds. First, unlike physical disability, which is typically
apparent, mental illness is a disease hidden in the mind. Because
mental illnesses "are far more complex and elusive" than physical
Force: Empirical Study of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 16J. CORP. L. 693, 698
(1991) (summarizing ten common false myths and misconceptions held by employers
of disabled persons).
1 See O'Keeffe, supra note 13, at 4. The historical perception of mental illness as
demonic in origin dates back to biblical times. See ROTH & KROLL, supra note 4, at
33-34 (discussing the portrayal of madness in the Old Testament and citing 1 Samuel
21:10-16).
" Pechman, supra note 12, at 26.
3' Cf Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927) (upholding a Virginia law that
provided for the sterilization of the feebleminded since "[t]hree generations of
imbeciles are enough").
" See Margaret A. Nosek, The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990-Will It Work?
(Con), 46 AM. J. OcCUPATIONAL THERAPY 466, 466 (1992) ("[B]y itself, the ADA is
powerless to resolve the innumerable barriers that have kept people with disabilities
as third-class citizens for millennia.").
s3 See SZASZ, supra note 3, at 192 ("Freedom does not cure cancer or heart disease.
Why, then, should we expect it to cure mental illness?").
34 Id. at 61.
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disabilities, employers are less likely to recognize an employee
with mental illness on sight.3 5 Moreover, while a physical disability
may have an overt manifestation, such as paraplegia, a mental illness
rarely does. 6 Often mental illness is "hidden," or not readily
apparent upon sight.8 7 This overt/covert distinction also justifies
differentiating mental illness from other types of mental impair-
ments that do manifest themselves physically, such as mental
retardation.3 8
Second, mental illness is harder to understand than physical
disability due to a lack of medical knowledge among professionals
and a lack of familiarity among laypersons. Thus, with respect to
mental illness, the law has evolved into an interactive exchange
among mental health specialists.3 9 Physical disabilities are "easier"
to deal with; they are more likely to have an agreed-upon course of
treatment and expected recovery time, whereas diagnoses of mental
illnesses are far less certain. °
35 Pechman, supra note 12, at 22. Of course, to some extent, even "pure" mental
illnesses present some psychosomatic manifestations. See RoTH & KROLL, supra note
4, at 27 (using depression to illustrate "the inseparability of physical and emotional
components" of mental illness).
' See Pechman, supra note 12, at 22 (stating that mental illness "does not reside
in a single organ or system").
37 See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 22.
' Seesupra note 9 (distinguishing mental illness from mental disability and noting
that the scope of this Comment only extends to the former); infra part I.B.3
(discussing the Supreme Court's treatment of this distinction in Heller v. Doe, 113
S. Ct. 2637 (1993)).
9 See Adrienne L. Hiegel, Note, Sexual Exclusions: The Americans with Disabilities
Act As a Moral Code, 94 COLUM. L. REv. 1451, 1458 (1994) (tracing the law's role in
defining disability and noting that "[d]iagnoses of capacity and mental illness are
now routinely made by lawyers in courtroom hearings as the roles of legal actor and
professional medical expert have become less and less clearly defined"). In mental
health law, the relevant experts include psychiatrists, psychologists, and psycho-
analysts; each of these professionals has a distinct role in determining the causes
and treatments of mental illnesses. For a concise description of the roles of these
specialists, see Stephen J. Morse, Crazy Behavior, Morals, and Science: An Analysis
of Mental Health Law, 51 S. CAL. L. REv. 527, 533 n.12 (1978); see also ZUCKERMAN ET
AL., supra note 9, at 71 (describing sources of professional help within mental
health services). These experts are relevant to our present inquiry because lawyers
pay them considerable deference in mental health law issues. See Morse, supra, at
536. Similarly, it behooves the legal scholar to consult mental health experts in
interpreting the ADA as it applies to persons with mental illnesses. See O'Keeffe,
supra note 13, at 10 (discussing the significance of the ADA for health care
specialists).
40 See Pechman, supra note 12, at 22 (comparing a slipped disc to schizophrenia
and noting that the latter is more difficult to diagnose, has an uncertain period of
recovery, and presents conflicting courses of action for treatment). Moreover, the
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Third, the hidden and misunderstood nature of mental illness
contributes to suspicion and disbelief that does not exist for
physical disabilities. Lurking behind a diagnosis is the "myth of
mental illness."4" A person disabled with anxiety disorder, for
example, simply does not have the same kind of hard evidence of
disability as does one who is confined to a wheelchair. While those
with physical disabilities are viewed as unfortunate victims, those
with mental illnesses must contend with the presumption that the
disability is somehow their fault.4 2
Finally, mental illness evokes a different response than physical
disability among the public. While one might feel pity for the
physically disabled, fear is a more common response to the mentally
ill, as noted in a 1991 Harris Poll.4 This study of public attitudes
toward persons with disabilities indicated that while contact with
physically disabled persons generally evoked pity and embarrass-
ment,44 contact with the mentally ill engendered significant
apprehension.4 5 Indeed, "characterizing a particular problem as
definitions and diagnoses of mental illness are constantly changing. See infra note 144
and accompanying text (arguing that the exercise of reasonable medical judgment is
inherently difficult with mental illness).
41 
THOMAS S. SzASZ, THE MYTH OF MENTAL ILLNESS (1974). Indeed, Szasz rejects
altogether the concept of mental illness, attributing the condition to a societal
metaphor. See id. at x; see also THOMAS S. SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS at
xix (1970) (analogizing the modern conception of mental illness to the medieval belief
in witchcraft).
42 Szasz states that
[allthough a person may behave abnormally because he has a brain disease,
the typical madman behaves the way he does because of his particular
adaptation to the events that make up his life. Examples abound in
Shakespeare's tragedies. King Lear goes mad because of his poor choice for
retirement. Lady Macbeth is driven mad by guilt and remorse over a
criminal career. Hamlet breaks down under the stress of discovering that
his mother and uncle murdered his father.
SZASZ, supra note 3, at 109 (emphasis added); see also id. at 118-20 (discussing the link
between mental illness and personal responsibility in Shakespeare's work).
s The Harris Poll, commissioned by the National Organization on Disability
(NOD), is conducted by interviewing adults (ages 18 and older) from across the
nation via telephone. See NATIONAL ORG. ON DISABILITY, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD
PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES 70 (1991). The 1991 Harris Poll reflects views from 1257
telephone interviews. See id. at 81.
4" The results of the Harris Poll indicate that upon encountering persons with
severe physical disabilities, 92% of those surveyed feel admiration, 74% experience
pity, and 58% feel embarrassed or awkward. See id. at 13. Moreover, 30% indicate
that they would be concerned about working closely with a severely disabled
coworker, and 23% would be uncomfortable with a boss who was seriously disabled.
See id. at 15.
4' See id. at 18 (reporting that only 19% of those surveyed reported being
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a mental disease may lead to greater stigmatization than would some
other way of describing the difficulty."
46
2. Mental Illness Involves Unique Treatment
Mental illness is not only distinguishable from other types of
disability on the basis of its manifestations, but also on the basis of
its treatment-the use of psychotropic medication. 4 Such medica-
tion is widely successful in treating the symptoms of mental illness
because it can control the biochemical imbalances in the body and
brain which researchers now believe cause many mental illnesses.4 8
For the most common mental illnesses,49 psychotropic medication
can be divided into four categories: 50  antidepressants (to treat
depressive disorders),5 1 antimanics (to treat bipolar disorder or
comfortable around the mentally ill); see also Blanck, supra note 28, at 794 (reviewing
the findings of the 1991 Harris Poll and noting that mental illnesses evoke particular
uneasiness).
46 ALEXANDER D. BROOKS, LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM
64 (1974).
47 Psychotropic medication refers to drugs used in the treatment of mental illness.
See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 72. Of course, there are other valid, and
often superior, treatment options for mental illness aside from psychotropic
medication. Among other reasons, the side effects that typically accompany the use
of medication may lead an individual to nonchemical types of therapy. See id. at 69.
Several types of psychotherapy are available such as individual therapy, group therapy,
or family therapy. See id. at 69-70. Different approaches to therapy exist as well,
including cognitive therapy (focusing on thought processes), behavioral therapy
(working to establish adaptive habits), interpersonal therapy (focusing on developing
relationships with others), psychosocial therapy (developing social and vocational
skills), and psychodynamic therapy (focusing on conflicts in the unconscious). See id.
In addition, therapy may be used in conjunction with psychotropic medication. See
id. at 67. For a number of reasons, this Comment specifically addresses the treatment
of the mentally ill through the use of psychotropic medication. First mental illness
is characterized by the predominance of treatment by medication. See infra note 61
and accompanying text. Second, the side effects of medication present potential
problems in the workplace that are not presented by therapy. See ZUCKERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 68-69. Finally, therapy is easily accommodated by the employer, and
attendance at therapy may not be as potentially threatening to employers as is the
employee's use of medication. See id. at 35 (noting that "many accommodations for
persons with mental illness simply require observation, flexibility and the application
of good management techniques").
48 See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 68.
41 See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
50 See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 68-69.
" Antidepressants control the level ofneurotransmitters in the brain and include
such medications as tricyclics, monoamine oxidase inhibitors (MAOIs), and serotonin
re-uptake inhibitors. The common side effects include drowsiness, dizziness, dry
mouth, blurred vision, nausea, and headaches. See id. at 68.
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manic-depressive disorder),5 2 antianxiety medication (to treat
anxiety disorders)," and antipsychotics (to treat schizophrenia).54
3. Mental Illness Has Received Special Supreme Court
Consideration on the Basis of Its Unique
Manifestations and Treatment
Although the Supreme Court has never explicitly held that the
mentally ill deserve special protection,55 the Court has recently
52 The most common form of antimanic is lithium carbonate. Lithium seeks to
level the mood swings among those suffering from manic-depressive disorder.
Because fatigue, cramps, and severe thirst commonly accompany the use of lithium,
additional medication may be prescribed to combat the drug's side effects. See id. at
68-69.
" The principal subtype of antianxiety medications is benzodiazepine, which
relaxes the individual. This calming effect, however, may cause such side effects as
slurred speech, confusion, fatigue, and breathing difficulties. Antidepressants may
also be prescribed for some anxiety disorders. See id.
' Antipsychotic medications seek to eliminate the symptoms of schizophrenia,
such as hallucinations and delusions, and to help the individual identify "the real
world." Common types include phenothiazines, butyrophenones, and thioxanthenes.
In addition to the side effects experienced through other psychotropic medications,
such as dry mouth, blurred vision, and rapid heartbeat, 15% to 20% of those treated
with antipsychotics experience tardive dyskinesia (TD). TD is a condition character-
ized by spasms of the mouth, specifically involuntary movements of the lips and
tongue. See id. at 69.
" Cf. Melton & Garrison, supra note 10, at 1008 (discussing the stigmatization and
"lengthy history of invidious discrimination against" the mentally disabled). This
article criticized the landmark Supreme Court case, City of Cleburne v. Cleburne
Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432 (1985), in which the Court refused to extend quasi-suspect
classification, and thus heightened scrutiny, to the mentally retarded. In Cleburne, the
Court struck down an ordinance that required a special use permit for the operation
of a group home for the mentally retarded because it was not rationally related to any
legitimate state purpose. See id. at 450. While this decision illustrates the Court's
reluctance to expand the definition of quasi-suspect class, the Fair Housing
Amendments Act of 1988 may be regarded as a response to Cleburne. See Robert L.
Schonfeld & Seth P. Stein, Fighting Municipal "Tag-Team": The Federal Fair Housing
Amendments Act and Its Use in Obtaining Access to Housing for Persons with Disabilities,
21 FoRDHAM URB. LJ. 299, 303 n.20 (1994) (noting that the FHAA would prohibit
the Cleburne ordinance). The Court has not yet addressed whether the mentally ill
should be considered a quasi-suspect class; however, the Court recently refused to
reconsider extending heightened scrutiny to the mentally retarded. See Heller v. Doe,
113 S. Ct. 2637, 2650 n.1 (1993) (SouterJ., dissenting) (discussing the respondent's
argument that the mentally retarded are a discrete and insular minority for whom
heightened scrutiny is mandated).
In light of Cleburne, it seemed unlikely that the Court would extend this
protected status to the mentally ill; to the extent that mental illness is not immutable,
but rather is treatable, mental illness seems an even less likely candidate for
heightened scrutiny than mental retardation. Nonetheless, the Court's recent
decision in Heller suggests that the mentally ill may deserve special protection. The
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legitimized their unique status in Heller v. Doe.5" Highlighting the
risk of erroneous diagnosis with respect to the mentally ill, the
Court compared mental illness to mental retardation and upheld a
state statute that distinguished between the two disabilities in
involuntary commitment proceedings." First, the Court noted the
difficulty inherent in diagnosing mental illness because the onset of
the disability is sudden and may not occur until adulthood." By
virtue of its physical manifestation, mental retardation, according to
the Court, is easier to identify. 9 Second, in discussing predictions
of dangerousness, the Court noted that while mental retardation is
a static, predictable condition, "[tihis is not so with the mentally ill.
Manifestations of mental illness may be sudden .... It is thus no
surprise that psychiatric predictions of future violent behavior by
the mentally ill are inaccurate." 60
Perhaps the most forceful distinction between the mentally
retarded and the mentally ill, however, was drawn between the
prevailing treatment methods. The mentally ill, the Court noted,
are subject to more intrusive treatments, ranging from thought
inquiries to psychotropic drug intake."'
Court acknowledged the unique challenges of the mentally ill and concluded that
legislatures may statutorily acknowledge this distinction. See id. at 2643-49 (endorsing
a Kentucky statute that provided a higher burden of proof for involuntary
commitment on the basis of mental illness).
Unlike the FHAA, which responded with retroactive protection, the ADA takes
a proactive approach in protecting the mentally ill by declaring that "individuals with
disabilities are a discrete and insular minority," thus deserving of protection against
the menace of discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(7) (Supp. V 1993) (borrowing
from United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) ("Prejudice
against discrete and insular minorities... may call for a correspondingly more
searching judicial inquiry.")).
1 113 S. Ct. 2637 (1993).
57 See id. at 2643-47.
See id. at 2644 (citing Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 430 (1979)).
5 See id. (comparing mental retardation with depression and schizophrenia); id.
at 2647 (noting that even experts in the mental health field face "severe difficulties
inherent in psychiatric diagnosis" of mental illnesses).
o Id. at 2644. The challenged statute required a dangerousness determination
as a prerequisite to commitment. See id. at 2641. The assessment asked whether
the individual presented "a danger or a threat of danger to self, family, or others."
Id. The Court's concern that assessments of dangerousness with respect to the
mentally ill carry a great risk of error is especially significant to this Comment,
given the recent EEOC standard that allows an employer to defend an ADA claim on
the basis that the employee presents a risk of safety to herself or others. See
infra part III.B (discussing the EEOC's risk-to-self-or-others standard for the ADA
safety defense).
61 See Heller, 113 S. Ct. at 2645. By contrast, treatment of the mentally retarded
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Thus, the Supreme Court supports the notion that the mentally
ill suffer from a condition sufficiently different from other disabi-
lities to warrant special consideration. Recall also that in Heller v.
Doe, the Court distinguished mental illness from mental retardation,
which is a disability presenting both mental and physical manifesta-
tions. The Court's arguments identifying "a commonsense
distinction between the mentally retarded and the mentally ill [that]
continues to present day"62 would seem to apply with even greater
force when comparing mental illness to purely physical disabilities.
The mentally ill individual's struggle for employment differs
from that of other disabled individuals by virtue of the special
challenges presented by mental illness. The workplace becomes a
bittersweet place in which the mentally ill person strives to achieve
societal integration only to be confronted with the reality of
discrimination. It has been left to Congress to eradicate stigmatiz-
ing actions and attitudes; the ADA represents the most recent and
comprehensive congressional effort to eliminate discrimination
against the disabled in the workplace.
II. THE ADA
A. General Application
"The purpose of the [ADA] ... is to provide a clear and
comprehensive national mandate to end discrimination against
individuals with disabilities and to bring persons with disabil-
ities into the economic and social mainstream of American life
does not typically include the use of psychotropic medication, but instead focuses on
"habilitation," such as "self-care and self-sufficiency skills." Id. (citing Youngberg v.
Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 309 (1982)).
6 2 Id. at 2646. The Court's decision in Heller v. Doe, which upheld as rational
Kentucky's use of a burden of proof for the involuntary commitment of the mentally
ill that was higher than that required for the commitment of the mentally retarded,
is, of course, not without criticism. Justice Souter, joined by justices Brennan and
Stevens and byjustice O'Connor in part, wrote a scathing dissent. See id. at 2650-58.
Among his criticisms, Justice Souter noted that psychotropic medications also have
application to the mentally retarded. See id. at 2655 (stating that 73% of the commit-
ted mentally retarded are treated with psychotropics). While this case presents
several compelling mental health issues in the context of involuntary commitment,
the application of Heller to this Comment is limited to the Court's comparison of
mental illness to other types of disabilities. For interesting commentaries examining
Heller, see Heidi A. Boyden, Heller v. Doe: Denying Equal Protection to the Mentally
Retarded, 21 NEw ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CiV. CONFINEMENT 437 (1995) and Mari-Rae
Sopper, Heller v. Doe: Involuntaty Commitment Under a Reasonable Doubt, 72 DENV.
U. L. REv. 491 (1995).
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... Recognizing that an estimated forty-three million persons
in the United States suffer from some type of disability, the
ADA expands the Rehabilitation Act of 197364 to protect America's
largest minority group from discrimination.65 It is with these
challenges in mind that the ADA strives to eliminate discrimina-
tory employment practices in what might be the most crucial
legislation ever enacted for disabled persons.6 6  Title I, the
most important section of the ADA,67 represents the most recent
comprehensive civil rights legislation protecting disabled employ-
ees. The importance of Title I stems from the fact that approx-
imately two-thirds of working-age persons with disabilities are
unemployed. 68
The provisions of Title I apply to employers with more than
fifteen employees. 69 In simplest terms, the ADA prohibits employ-
ers from discriminating against persons with physical or mental
impairments who are otherwise qualified, with or without reason-
able accommodation, to perform the essential functions required by
a particular job. As a defense to a charge of discrimination, the
employer may prove that accommodating the disability would inflict
6S HOUSE EDUC. AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 7, at 22.
-29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797 (1988 & Supp. V 1993). The drafters modeled the ADA
upon the Rehabilitation Act as well as other prior civil rights laws. See HOUSE EDUC.
AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 7, at 55. Indeed, the ADA seeks to fill the gaps left
by prior law and, to that end, is an expansion of coverage. See Wendy E. Parmet,
Discrimination and Disability: The Challenges of the ADA, 18 LAw MED. & HEALTH CARE
331, 331 (1990). Case law interpreting the Rehabilitation Act, because it is the
predecessor statute to the ADA, is instructive. Although the cases that emerged
under the Rehabilitation Act lack binding precedential value when applied to the
ADA, their authority remains very persuasive in shapingjudicial interpretation. See
infra notes 74, 87 and accompanying text (discussing the relationship between the
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA).
65 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(1) (Supp. V 1993) (ADA Statement of Findings).
See O'Keeffe, supra note 13, at 1.
"See Parry, supra note 1, at 525 (calling Title I the "single most important title,
since employment is the key to independence"); Debra Rybski, A Quality Implemen-
tation of Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 46 AM. J. OCCUPATIONAL
THERAPY 409, 409 (1992) ("Many proponents of the law believe that Title I may be
the most important provision.").
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a) (ADA Statement of Findings) (noting the importance
Congress placed upon Title I); see also H.R. REP. NO. 485, 101st Cong., 2d Sess., pt.
2, at 32 (1990) (noting that 66% of disabled working-age people are unemployed and
desire employment); ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 15 (same).
69 The ADA was implemented in two phases over four years. Title I applied to
employers with more than 25 employees as ofJuly 26, 1992, and extended coverage
to employers with more than 15 employees on July 26, 1994. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 12111(5)(A) (Supp. V 1993).
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undue hardship on the business70 or that the disabled employee
poses a direct threat to health or safety in the workplace. 71 The
ADA bestows the interpretive responsibility of Title I upon the
EEOC.72
B. Stating a Claim Under the ADA-The Requirements
The ADA is a string of statutory buzzwords that require careful
interpretation to effectuate the Act's goals. Paraphrased, the ADA
protects from employment discrimination persons with disabilities
who, with or without reasonable accommodation, are otherwise
qualified to perform the essential functions of the position they are
seeking. 3 The next part of this Comment analyzes these prerequi-
sites for ADA protection.
1. A "Disability"
The ADA invokes three possible definitions of "disability":
The term "disability" means, with respect to an individual-
(A) a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one
or more of the major life activities of such individual; or
(B) a record of such an impairment; or
(C) being regarded as having such an impairment.
74
10 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10).
71 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b); infra part III.A. The ADA literature has shortened the
"direct threat to safety defense" (or "direct threat qualification") to its nickname, the
"safety defense." See Bryan P. Neal, The Proper Standardfor Risk of Future Injury Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act: Risk to Self or Risk to Others, 46 SMU L. REV. 483,
484 (1992).
See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(1).
" See infra note 100.
74 42 U.S.C. § 12102(2) (Supp. V 1993); cf. Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C.
§ 794 (1988 & Supp. V 1993) (defining the scope of the Rehabilitation Act). That the
ADA uses the term "disabled" reflects the deliberate abandonment of the label
"handicapped" used in the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act. Nevertheless,
the ADA's coverage of "disability" is only marginally different from that of "handicap"
under the Rehabilitation Act due to the nearly identical definitions of the terms. See
Kathleen D. Henry, Civil Rights and the Disabled. A Comparison of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 in the Employment Setting, 54 ALB.
L. REV. 123, 127-28 (1989) (noting that the acts share similar statutory language and
that the ADA expands the scope of covered employers); see also Chai R. Feldblum, The
Americans with Disabilities Act Definition of Disability, 7 LAB. LAW. 11, 12-13 (1991)
(briefly describing the evolution of the ADA definition of disability and its
relationship to the Rehabilitation Act); supra note 64 (noting that the Rehabilitation
Act is the predecessor statute to the ADA); infra note 87 (same).
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Satisfying any one of the three parts will suffice to show a "disabil-
ity" under the ADA. The following subsections evaluate each one
of these possibilities in turn.
a. "Substantially Limiting" Impairment
The first definition includes diagnosable disorders; for mental
impairments, this definition includes most disorders defined by the
American Psychiatric Association in the DSM-IV.7 5 The statute
makes no attempt to enumerate the covered disabilities due to the
continuous discovery of new disorders and the impossibility of
comprehensiveness.7 6 Furthermore, this first prong does not cover
simple physical characteristics (for example, eye color), simple
personality characteristics (for example, bad temper), or economic,
environmental, or cultural circumstances (for example, age and
prison record)." Even if a person has a qualifying impairment,
that alone is not enough to invoke the protection of the ADA; the
disability must also "substantially limit a major life function,"78
which includes walking, breathing, caring for oneself, speaking,
seeing, hearing, learning, working, or engaging in community
activities.
79
b. A "Record of Impairment"
The second definition, requiring a "record of impairment,"
exists to protect persons with a history of disability (whether or
not they are currently disabled) and also those persons who have
been misdiagnosed. The EEOC guidelines explicitly state that this
prong is intended to protect persons with a history of mental
" Seesupra note 9 (discussing the drafters' intent to give the DSM-IV an authorita-
tive role in defining mental impairments for the purposes of the ADA); see also infra
text accompanying note 99 (enumerating the exclusions to the category of qualified
impairments).
76 See HOUSE EDUC. AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 7, at 51 (noting the difficulty
of "ensuring the comprehensiveness of such a list").
" See id. at 51-52.
78 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(i) (1995).
79 See HOUSE EDUC. AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 7, at 52. Thus, very minor
impairments, such as an infected finger or a bad mood, do not constitute a disability
for purposes of the ADA, as these trivial conditions do not substantially limit a major
life activity. Cf R. Bales, Once Is Enough: Evaluating When a Person Is Substantially
Limited in Her Ability to Work, 11 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 203, 221-45 (1993) (offering
suggestions and tests for determining when a person's disability substantially limits
a major life activity).
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illness."0 Again, in order to be covered by the ADA, the person
with a record of impairment must be substantially limited in a major
life activity.
c. Being "Regarded As" Disabled
The third definition, "being regarded as having an impairment,"
abandons the "substantially limited" requirement in protecting
those perceived to have a disability."1 For example, an employee
believed by his employer to suffer from schizophrenia would
be covered by the Act.82 This provision is especially notable as
it protects even the individual who has no substantially limiting
impairment at all; it is enough to be "regarded as" disabled.
In interpreting an identical prong under section 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act, the Supreme Court noted that the legisla-
tive history of the ADA evinces "Congress['s] acknowledge[ment]
that society's accumulated myths and fears about disability and dis-
ease are as handicapping as are the physical limitations that
flow from actual impairment." 3 It is this third prong that attacks
the consequences of stigma; an employer may not refuse to
hire someone based on (fear of) negative reactions to the indi-
vidual.84
80 See EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 25, at II-2(b).
See id. at II-2(c).
• It is significant that this third prong is most frequently invoked in the context
of Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome. See, e.g., Local 1812, Am. Fed'n of Gov't
Employees v. Department of State, 662 F. Supp. 50, 54 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that
one is considered to have a handicap under the Rehabilitation Act if he or she is
perceived as a carrier of the HIV virus).
' School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273, 284 (1987). In articulating the rationale
for this third prong, the Court noted that the effect of an impairment reaches
others as well as the individual and need not be actual to be detrimental: being
regarded as having an impairment "might not diminish a person's physical or
mental capabilities, but could nevertheless substantially limit that person's abil-
ity to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the impairment." Id.
at 283.
84 See HOUSE EDUC. AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 7, at 53 ("[I]f an employer
refuses to hire someone because of a fear of the 'negative reactions' of others to
the individual ... that person is covered under the third prong of the definition
of disability."). The goal of this prong is to ensure that mentally ill individuals
are judged on their ability rather than on their disability. "One of the most
important steps employers can take to ensure compliance with Title I is a change
in attitude stemming from the recognition that people with mental illnesses are
individuals who should be judged on their ability." ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9,
at 15.
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2. Mental Illness As a "Disability"
Mental illness is second only to disability claims based upon
back injuries as the leading source of ADA discrimination
charges.85 As noted earlier, there is no list of covered mental
illnesses, and given the different degrees and types of mental illness,
each claim must be decided on an individual basis.86  Mental
illnesses that have been determined to come within the statutory
definition of the Rehabilitation Act8 ' include: schizophrenia, 8
paranoid schizophrenia,8 9  childhood schizophrenia,90 major
depression (unipolar depression, suicidal depression, or depressive
neurosis),9 manic-depressive syndrome (bipolar depression),
92
borderline personality disorder,9 3 chronic mental illness,94 and
' In the first year after enactment of the ADA (as of July 1993), the EEOC
received 12,670 ADA claims. Back injuries and mental illness were the two leading
grounds, accounting for 18.5% and 9.8% of all claims, respectively. See Patrick L.
Vaccaro & Margaret R. Bryant, Looking Back on the First Year of the Americans with
Disabilities Act, LEGAL MGMT.,Jan.-Feb. 1994, at 12, 12.
' Cf E.E. Black, Ltd. v. Marshall, 497 F. Supp. 1088, 1098 (D. Haw. 1980)
("Words are not precise symbols and statutory definitions are often unable to
precisely define and cover all possible situations.").
"' As the predecessor statute to the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act provides
instruction in determining which mental illnesses will be recognized as impairments
sufficient to warrant statutory protection. See Casey, supra note 16, at 397 ("Congress
intended that the case law developed under the Rehabilitation Act be used to decide
ADA questions."); supra note 64 (noting that the ADA was modeled in large part
upon the Rehabilitation Act); supra note 74 (identifying the similarities between
statutory language used in the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act). But see Barbara A.
Lee, Reasonable Accommodation Under the Americans with Disabilities Act: The Limitations
of Rehabilitation Act Precedent, 14 BERKELEYJ. EMPLOYMENT & LAB. L. 201, 235 (1993)
(noting that the differences between the statutes cast doubt on the Rehabilitation
Act's ability to predict judicial outcomes under the ADA).
' See Doe v. Colautti, 592 F.2d 704, 708 (3d Cir. 1979) (stating that Doe, a
schizophrenic, was "handicapped" for purposes of the Rehabilitation Act); Bolthouse
v. Continental Wingate Co., 656 F. Supp. 620, 625-26 (W.D. Mich. 1987) (stating that
"there can be no doubt" that schizophrenia fits under the Rehabilitation Act's
definition of handicapped).
" See Franklin v. United States Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1218 (S.D. Ohio
1988) (placing paranoid schizophrenia in the handicapped category); see also infra
notes 152-55 and accompanying text (examining Franklin in the context of the direct
threat qualification).
" See Gladys J. v. Pearland Indep. Sch. Dist., 520 F. Supp. 869, 876 (S.D. Tex.
1981) (describing childhood schizophrenia as a severe handicap).
9 See Doe v. Region 13 Mental Health-Mental Retardation Comm'n, 704 F.2d
1402, 1408 (5th Cir. 1983) (accepting various forms of serious depression as
handicaps).
' See generally Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1985) (assuming
throughout that manic depression is a handicap).
9s See Doe v. New York Univ., 666 F.2d 761, 775 (2d Cir. 1981) (defining a severe
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severe psychiatric difficulties.95
In other circumstances, courts have refused to extend disability
status to certain mental illnesses. 6 In addition, the ADA expressly
excludes certain mental illnesses, most conspicuously sexual
disorders, from coverage, which has led to the criticism that the
ADA "carve[s] out a space of permissive employer discrimina-
tion."" Specifically, the Act does not recognize its "List of 11"
disorders, which is comprised of transvestism, pedophilia, exhibi-
tionism, voyeurism, transsexualism, gender identity disorders not
resulting from physical impairment, other sexual behavior disor-
ders,98 compulsive gambling, kleptomania, pyromania, and psycho-
active substance abuse disorders resulting from current, illegal use
of drugs. 9
incapacity to handle stressful situations as a handicap).
See Edge v. Pierce, 540 F. Supp. 1300, 1305 (D.NJ. 1982) (assuming the
existence of a handicap in this situation).
" See Doe v. Marshall, 459 F. Supp. 1190, 1191 (S.D. Tex. 1978) (finding that the
defendant was correctly labeled handicapped), vacated on other grounds, 622 F.2d 118
(5th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 993 (1981).
1 See, e.g., Forrisi v. Bowen, 794 F.2d 931,934 (4th Cir. 1986) (acknowledging that
the plaintiff suffered from acrophobia but concluding that the impairment did not
substantially limit a major life function); Ross v. Beaumont Hosp., 687 F. Supp. 1115,
1118-20 (E.D. Mich. 1988) (recognizing narcolepsy as a handicap but holding that
abusive behavior, and not mental illness, was the basis for recommending final
termination of employment); Matzo v. Postmaster Gen., 685 F. Supp. 260, 263
(D.D.C. 1987) (holding that a manic-depressive individual was not otherwise qualified
for the position), affid, 861 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1988); Swann v. Walters, 620 F. Supp.
741, 746-47 (D.D.C. 1984) (disallowing paranoid schizophrenia as the basis of the
plaintiff's claim as the claimant's termination was not based solely on the mental
illness).
"' Hiegel, supra note 39, at 1492.
95 See id. at 1473-74.
9 See 42 U.S.C. § 12211 (Supp. V 1993); see also Hiegel, supra note 39, at 1452 n.9
(demonstrating that the excluded disorders are defined in the DSM-II1 (revised by the
DSM-IV] used by the drafters and arguing that these exclusions illustrate Congress's
attempt to use the ADA to codify moral norms). The Act does cover alcoholics and
recovered illegal drug abusers. See 42 U.S.C. § 12114(b)-(c); see also Lee, supra note
87, at 243-49 (noting the ADA's disparate treatment of alcohol and illegal drug
abusers). For an in depth discussion of the ADA's coverage of addiction, see
generally Henderson, supra note 9. By contrast, the Rehabilitation Act, protected
current substance abuse users as long as their use did not present a threat to their
work, property, or others. See Haggard, supra note 9, at 354-55. To demonstrate the
complexity of the situation, note that statistics evidence a strong correlation between
mental illness and substance abuse. See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 14-15.
Over half of all adults who have suffered from substance abuse disorders have also
had at least one mental illness; and 30% of adults with mental illness also have had
substance abuse disorders. See id.
A piece of legislative history is of interest here. During congressional discussion
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3. "Otherwise Qualified Individual" and "Essential Functions"
In addition to having a disability, the individual must be
qualified for the position in order to come within the ADA's
protection.1"' Two inquiries determine whether the individual is
qualified for the job.' First, the individual must be "otherwise
qualified" for the position, meaning that she must meet the
necessary, business-related job prerequisites. 10 2  Second, the
person must be able to perform the "essential functions" of the
position with or without the employer's "reasonable accommoda-
tion."10 3  Congress deemed the "essential functions" element
important "to ensure that individuals with disabilities.., are not
denied employment opportunities because they are unable to
perform marginal functions of the position.""0 4 "Essential," as
distinguished from "marginal," functions are those duties that are
fundamental to the position because either they are the reason the
position exists, they are critical to the operation of the business, or
they require specialized knowledge.'0 5 An individual's diagnosable
mental illness may render him unqualified. In Southeastern Commu-
nity College v. Davis, °6 the Supreme Court held that an individual
of which conditions ought to be excluded, Senator Armstrong proposed an
amendment, which he justified on the basis of religious and moral convictions, that
mandated that psychiatric disorders defined by the DSM-III-R [revised by the DSM-
IV] should be excluded from ADA coverage. See 135 CONG. REC. S10,753-54 (daily
ed. Sept. 7, 1989); 135 CONG. REC. S10,772-74 (daily ed. Sept. 8, 1989). The
Senator's retreat from this disturbing request came only after a reminder from
Senator Domenici that both President Lincoln and Winston Churchill suffered from
bipolar, or manic, depression. See 135 CONG. REC. S10,778-79 (daily ed. Sept. 7
1989).
" The statute reads, in pertinent part: "The term 'qualified individual with a
disability' means an individual with a disability who, with or without reasonable
accommodation, can perform the essential functions of the employment position that
such individual holds or desires." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). The term "qualified" refers
to current ability, not potential for future incapacitation. See HOUSE EDUC. AND
LABOR REPORT, supra note 7, at 55.




103 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
10" EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 25, at III.
10" See id. app. B (providing interpretive guidance for 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)
(1992)). An example of this essential-marginal distinction is helpful. For a secretary,
typing would be an essential function; delivering copies to the offices 30 floors up,
however, might be a marginal function such that an individual with severe acrophobia
(fear of heights) could remain qualified for this position if the employer accommo-
dates the request to delegate that task to another employee.
106 442 U.S. 397 (1979).
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is not qualified for a position if his handicap precludes him from
performing the essential functions of the job.117  In addition,
absenteeism frequently disqualifies persons with mental illness as




If a disabled employee has a viable ADA claim based upon
satisfaction of the foregoing requirements, the employer, once made
aware of the disability, may have a duty to provide reasonable
accommodation."0 9 While this duty may be difficult for employers
'07 See id. at 406; see also Fields v. Lyng, 705 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (D. Md. 1988)
(holding that an individual diagnosed with borderline personality disorder with
obsessive-compulsive features and side effects of anxiety and kleptomania, who was
terminated for shoplifting, was not "otherwise qualified" to perform the essential
functions of his job since "handicap discrimination laws protect only those who can
do their job in spite of their handicap, not those who could do it but for their
handicap"), affd, 888 F.2d 1385 (4th Cir. 1989).
" See, e.g., Walders v. Garrett, 765 F. Supp. 303,310-12 (E.D. Va. 1991) (holding
that a civilian employee who suffered from chronic fatigue immune dysfunction
syndrome, resultingin frequent absenteeism, was not otherwise qualified to be a Navy
librarian), aff'd, 956 F.2d 1163 (4th Cir. 1992); Matzo v. Postmaster Gen., 685 F.
Supp. 260, 263 (D.D.C. 1987) (holding that a person suffering from bipolar (manic)
depression was not otherwise qualified for a clerical position with the Post Office due
to his very poor attendance record and frequent inability to work a full day), afj'd,
861 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
109 See EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 25, at III. Because
employers need only accommodate "known limitations of a qualified individual with
a disability," it is an employee's responsibility to make the employer aware of his
mental illness. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 22. This is especially important
for the mentally ill as their disabilities are often hidden. See supra note 37 and
accompanying text. Thus, it is the employee's responsibility to make the employer
aware of the disability and to request an accommodation. See ZUCKERMAN ET AL.,
supra note 9, at 22. Although it is the employer's duty to craft a reasonable
accommodation, the employee may make suggestions. See id. Because of the
individualized nature of mental illness, the employee is often the best person to
suggest appropriate reasonable accommodations. See id. at 37. An employer must
provide a reasonable accommodation but has no duty to accept one suggestion over
another. See id. at 22. To ensure successful implementation of effective, workable
solutions toward the best workplace environment, this process of negotiation requires
open, confidential, and honest communication between the employer and employee.
See id. at 4 ("[T]wo way communication and cooperation between employee and
employer builds the trust that is necessary to overcome barriers to successful
implementation of Title I and to achieve full integration of people with mental illness
into the workplace."); see also Paul F. Mickey, Jr. & Maryelena Pardo, Dealing with
Mental Disabilities Under the ADA, 9 LAB. LAxW. 531, 540 (1993) (advocating an open
dialogue and input from both employer and employee in determining a reasonable
accommodation).
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to meet, mental health and legal scholars have offered many
suggestions."1 Accommodations appropriate for persons with
mental illness include, but are not limited to, creating flexible or
modified work schedules, putting communications in writing,
counseling and educating employees and managers about mental
illnesses, establishing conflict resolution mechanisms, making
changes in the physical environment to minimize anxiety, maintain-
ing good lighting, avoiding distractions and needless stimuli,
restructuring job duties, presenting a congenial atmosphere, and
providing positive feedback.1 11
C. Employer Defenses to an ADA Claim
An employer may escape ADA liability by rebutting the prima
facie claim or by asserting an affirmative defense. Thus, as a
threshold matter, the employer may challenge the requisite showing
of disability; the ADA imposes no restrictions on the employer when
the employee fails to establish disability. In addition, the ADA
provides employers with two affirmative defenses, which, if
successful, relieve the employer of the duty to accommodate
reasonably a disabled employee. First, the employer need not grant
a reasonable accommodation if doing so would impose an undue
hardship." 2 Since the cost of reasonably accommodating mentally
110 For discussion of the reasonable accommodation requirement, see generally
ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 34-49; James A. Burstein, What Is "Reasonable
Accommodation" Under the Americans with Disabilities Act?, PRAC. LAW., July 1992, at
63; Paul Carling, Reasonable Accommodations in the Workplace for Persons with Psychi-
atric Disabilities, in IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMERICANS WITH DISABILITIES ACT FOR
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 13, at 103, 103-36; Employers Encounter Difficulties, supra
note 11, at 58; Russell H. Gardner & Carolyn J. Campanella, The Undue Hardship
Defense to the Reasonable Accommodation Requirement of the Americans with Disabil-
ities Act of 1990, 7 LAB. LAw. 37, 38 (1991); Deborah Zuckerman, Reasonable Accom-
modations for People with Mental Illness Under the ADA, 17 MENTAL & PHYSICAL
DISABILITY L. REP. 311 (1993); Jeffrey 0. Cooper, Comment, Overcoming Barriers
to Employment: The Meaning of Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship in the
Americans with Disabilities Act, 139 U. PA. L. REv. 1423 (1991); Ren~e L. Cyr,
Note, The Americans with Disabilities Act: Implications for Job Reassignment and the
Treatment of Hypersusceptible Employees, 57 BROOK. L. REV. 1237 (1992); Haggard, supra
note 9.
Perhaps the voluminous accumulation of literature discussing the meaning of
"reasonable accommodation" is explained by the fact that this term of art is unique
to the ADA. The Rehabilitation Act itself was silent as to this requirement; rather,
"reasonable accommodation" was born of Department of Health and Human Services
regulations. See Parmet, supra note 64, at 341 & n.31. Thus, the ADA's codification
of "reasonable accommodation" marks a significant advancement in disability law.
" See ZUCIKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 44-45.
12 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(10) (Supp. V 1993). In determining whether or not
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ill employees is usually low,113 accommodations for the mentally
ill rarely impose undue hardship, making employers more likely to
rely on the second affirmative defense, the direct threat qualifica-
tion (the "safety defense"). 4 The following Part considers the
current approaches and present dangers inherent in the application
of the direct threat defense to ADA claims by the mentally ill.
III. THE SAFETY DEFENSE
A. The Safety Defense: Defining the Direct Threat Standard
An employer invokes the safety defense when she believes that
hiring or keeping the employee would present a threat to safety in
the workplace. Under the safety defense, a "direct threat" is
defined as:
[A] significant risk of substantial harm to the health or safety of
the individual or others that cannot be eliminated or reduced by
reasonable accommodation. The determination that an individual
poses a 'direct threat' shall be based on an individualized assess-
ment of the individual's present ability to safely perform the
essential functions of the job. This assessment shall be based on
a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current
medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective
evidence. In determining whether an individual would pose a
direct threat, the factors to be considered include:
employing the individual would force the employer to sustain an undue burden, the
ADA proposes several factors for consideration: the financial resources of the
employer, the impact of the accommodation on the workplace, the size, location, and
type of business involved, and the number of persons employed at the workplace. See
id.; see also Gardner v. Morris, 752 F.2d 1271, 1283-84 (8th Cir. 1985) (finding that
providinga manic-depressive individual, who successfully controlled his mental illness
with lithium, with a physician and on-site laboratory facilities was an undue hardship
because it was cost prohibitive). But cf. Cooper, supra note 110, at 1453-54 (criticizing
the holding in Gardner and arguing that this type of accommodation is reasonable
under the ADA).
Us See Zuckerman, supra note 110, at 314 (stating that more than two-thirds of all
accommodations cost less than $500). Although undue hardship is typically couched
in financial terms, the defense is not limited to excessive economic demands. An
accommodation will also impose undue hardship when it is "extensive," "substantial,"
"disruptive," or when it "fundamentally alter[s] the nature or operation of the
business." ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 23.
114 Curiously, the direct threat standard was not originally codified as an employer
defense. Only in response to concerns that the direct threat standard implied a
presumption of risk, which the employee had to rebut as a part of the prima facie
claim, did the EEOC place the direct threat qualification within the ADA. See Equal
Employment Opportunity for Individuals with Disabilities, 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1992).
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1) The duration of the risk;
2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
4) The imminence of the potential harm."5
The ADA exempts the employer from her duty to reasonably
accommodate an otherwise qualified disabled individual when the
presence of that individual as an employee in the workplace creates
a direct threat."' Congress defines "direct threat" as "a signifi-
cant risk to the health or safety of others that cannot be eliminated
by reasonable accommodation.""' The direct threat must relate
to the current ability of the individual to perform safely the job's
essential functions. 1 Moreover, in order to invoke the defense,
the employer must clearly identify the specific risk posed by the
employee."' Even if a direct threat exists, the employer may not
use the defense if a reasonable accommodation would enable the
employee to work safely; rather, the employer must make an
affirmative effort to eliminate or reduce the direct threat. 2 °
B. The EEOC Interpretive Standard: Risk-to-Self-or-Others
Through its regulations, the EEOC purports to give guidance
to employers in assessing the direct threat and invoking the
safety defense. The EEOC has already recognized the safety
defense's potential for premature application to mentally ill
individuals. In its guidelines for implementation of the employment
provisions of the ADA, the EEOC stated that, "[f]or individuals
with mental or emotional disabilities, the employer must identify
the specific behavior on the part of the individual that would pose
the direct threat."' 2 ' Thus, in helping Congress to shape the
15 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1995). As will be discussed, this definition is a
codification of the Supreme Court's decision in School Bd. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273
(1981). The force of this Comment is that a fifth factor, concerning psychotropic
medication, should be added to this definition. See infra part IV.
116 See 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (Supp. V 1993).
11 42 U.S.C. § 12111(3).
11 See 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).
.19 See Mary Anne Sedey, The Threat to the Safety Defense Under the Americans
with Disabilities Act: Its Source, Surrounding Caselaw, and Interpretation, 39 FED. B.
NEWS &J. 96, 98 (1992) (noting that, in interpreting the safety defense, the EEOC
responded to the concerns of disability-rights groups by "narrowly confin[ing]"
the defense).
120 See EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL, supra note 25, at IV-5.
121 56 Fed. Reg. 35,745 (1991). The commentary contains a similar requirement
for physical disability. See id.
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ADA, the EEOC regulations embodied some skepticism regarding
the use of this defense and used this foresight to attempt to
confine the defense by construing it narrowly. 22 Later EEOC
regulations, however, interpret the statute to adopt a "risk-to-self-or-
others" standard. 2 The adoption of this standard generated
critical comments from disabilities rights groups, 124 who even-
tually persuaded the EEOC to make modest changes to this inter-
pretation. t25 Nevertheless, a broad scope of unacceptable risk
persists, and it is with this standard that disabled employees
must contend.
The EEOC interpretation has been criticized on at least four
grounds. 126  Specifically, opponents of the interpretation argue
that it is paternalistic, 127 inconsistent with legislative history
122 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1995); see also Bonnie P. Tucker, The Americans with
Disabilities Act Interpreting the Title I Regulations: The Hard Cases, 2 CORNELLJ.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 1, 11-12 (1992) (emphasizing that the direct threat analysis must be
individualized and that "a statistically significant risk of harm" is insufficient to
establish the safety defense).
"2 Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12113(b) (setting out the ADA qualification standard that
"an individual shall not pose a direct threat to the health or safety of other individuals
in the workplace") with 29 C.F.R. § 1630.15(b)(2) (1995) (EEOC guidelines) (adopting
a risk-to-self-or-others standard for the purposes of Title I by interpreting the ADA
to mean a direct threat "to the health or safety of the individual or others" (emphasis
added)).
1'24 See 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1992) ("Many disability rights groups and individuals
with disabilities ... expressed concern that the reference to 'risk to self' would result
in direct threat determinations that are based on negative stereotypes and paternalis-
tic views about what is best for individuals with disabilities.").
125 Specifically, the EEOC responded with five changes to its proposed rule. First,
the EEOC sharpened its definition of direct threat to highlight that a risk need not
be completely eliminated, but rather just reduced to a safe level by reasonable
accommodation. Second, the EEOC expanded the scope of relevant evidence that
should be taken into account in applying the standard and emphasized the need for
individualized assessments. Third, the EEOC precluded predictions of future risk as
an element of the direct threat evaluation. Fourth, an imminence requirement was
added to the direct threat standard. Finally, the EEOC emphasized that the safety
defense may be invoked against any employee, notjust disabled ones. See Neal, supra
note 71, at 487 n.24 (outlining the EEOC changes and criticizing the fifth change as
"mere rhetoric").
2' See id. at 495-513 (advancing the arguments discussed below, and advocat-
ing either that the EEOC abandon the risk-to-self standard or, in the alternative,
that the courts refuse to enforce this interpretation); Parry, supra note 1, at
531 (criticizing the EEOC approach because it contradicts notions of self-deter-
mination and leaves open the possibility that a "so-called threat" could be used
to disguise antidisability animus).
127 See infra note 132 and accompanying text (explaining the paternalism
argument).
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and congressional intent,128 contrary to Rehabilitation Act case
law,129 and an excessive and unauthorized exercise of power.
30
"' The EEOC justifies its interpretation as being supported by "the legislative
history of the ADA and the case law interpreting § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act."
56 Fed. Reg. 35,730 (1991) (EEOC rule). The EEOC standard is inconsistent with the
plain language of the Act, which dearly contemplates a risk-to-others standard. See
supra note 123 (comparing the ADA language with the EEOC guidelines with respect
to the direct threat qualification). It is telling that, in interpreting the same direct
threat qualification standard for Title III of the ADA, the Department of Justice
("DOJ") used a risk-to-others standard. See 28 C.F.R. § 36.208(a) (1995) (DOJ rule)
(implementing a risk-to-others standard with respect to the Title III public
accommodations provisions of the ADA). The inconsistency between the DOJ and
the EEOC interpretations hardly lends support to the EEOC position that the ADA
manifests clear legislative support for its interpretation. See supra note 125 and
accompanying text. Absent a distinction between the goals of Title I and Title III,
this inconsistency remains problematic.
"m To the extent that Rehabilitation Act case law informs implementation of the
ADA, see supra notes 64, 74, 87, it is troubling that the EEOC justifies its standard
based upon the Rehabilitation Act. In fact, that statute provides little guidance, as
the cases under the Rehabilitation Act itself perpetuate uncertainty by invoking
different standards in differentjurisdictions. Some courts, consistent with statutory
language, have employed a "risk-to-others" standard. See, e.g., Chalk v. United States
Dist. Court, 840 F.2d 701,710 (9th Cir. 1988); Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716
F.2d 227, 232-33 (3d Cir. 1983). Others have invoked a "risk-to-self-or-others"
formulation. See, e.g., Chiari v. League City, 920 F.2d 311, 316 (5th Cir. 1991);
Mantolete v. Bolger, 767 F.2d 1416, 1421 (9th Cir. 1985). A few courts have adopted
a "risk-to-self" standard. See, e.g., Bentivegna v. United States Dept. of Labor, 694
F.2d 619, 622 (9th Cir. 1982); Kampmeler v. Nyquist, 553 F.2d 296, 299-300 (2d Cir.
1977). In fact, the safety defense case law under the Rehabilitation Act "exhibit[ed]
no pattern of distinction with regard to why a given standard [was] better or worse
than another [as] ... [no] position [was] fully supported by the case law and [all]
positions... cite[d] cases with an opposing viewpoint." Neal, supra note 71, at 502.
Thus, relying on Rehabilitation Act precedent tojustify the EEOC standard ultimately
fails.
"' The risk-to-self component of the EEOC's risk-to-self-or-others standard may
violate the Chevron doctrine, established by the Supreme Court in Chevron U.S.A. Inc.
v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). Chevron establishes
that an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous statute must be accepted unless it is
"arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the statute." Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844.
Still, "the court, as well as the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously
expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 842-43. Since the ADA clearly states that direct
threat means significant risk of harm to others, the EEOC has arguably exceeded its
statutory authority in contradicting, by grafting onto, the plain language of the
statute. It remains uncertain whether the regulation will withstand the inevitable
flood of litigation that will challenge it. While courts typically follow an agency's
interpretation, they may refuse to follow an EEOC regulation "where there are
'compelling indications that it is wrong.'" Espinoza v. Farah Mfg. Co., 414 U.S. 86,
94-95 (1973) (quoting Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969));
see also General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 144-45 (1976) (refusing to follow
EEOC regulations that contradicted Congress's "plain meaning").
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Of these criticisms, the concern for paternalism deserves
particular attention in the mental illness context. Since
the autonomy of the mentally ill already suffers because of
their needs to rely on medication and to work to maintain societal
integration,"' the EEOC standard should reflect the capability,
rather than the deviance, of persons with mental illness. Because
paternalism is inherently condescending,"'2 it inescapably results
in discrimination. "Paternalism is perhaps the most pervasive
form of discrimination for people with disabilities and has been a
major barrier to such individuals.""'3 Since pity is a common
131 See supra note 3.
1.2 The values of individual autonomy and personal sovereignty, paralleling the
antipaternalism movement, have been embraced since the 19th century. Philosopher
John Stuart Mill proclaimed the classic argument against paternalism:
[Tihe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any
member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to
others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient
warrant.... Over himself, over his own body and mind, the individual is
sovereign.
JOHN STUART MILL, ON LIBERTY 68-69 (Gertrude Himmelfarb ed., Penguin Books
1985) (1859). Mill's antipaternalistic philosophy has not gone unchallenged. See
Neal, supra note 71, at 509 (concluding that "modern society has not ad6pted Mill's
anti-paternalistic message"). Among the most significant obstacles to Mill's message
is the doctrine ofparenspatriae. Parenspatriae, literally "parent of the country," refers
to "the principle that the state must care for those who cannot take care of
themselves," such as minors or the mentally ill. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1114 (6th
ed. 1990). The doctrine presumes that the mentally ill are, by their very nature,
unable to make decisions that are in their best interest; it equates mental illness with
irrationality. Historically, courts have invoked the parens patriae rationale for
confining the mentally ill in an effort to protect society from deviant behavior. See,
e.g., O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 580-84 (1975) (Burger, CJ., concurring)
(finding a liberty/due process violation for involuntary and unnecessary commitment
of an individual). Significantly, the Supreme Court has described the parens patriae
power as the right of "the sovereign or his representative as the 'general guardian of
all infants, idiots, and lunatics.'" Hawaii v. Standard Oil Co., 405 U.S. 251,257 (1972)
(quoting 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *47).
Thus, States, by and through their general police powers preserved by the
Constitution, see U.S. CONST. amend. X, have enjoyed significant control in evaluating
and managing risk for the mentally ill. This Comment is principally concerned that
the ADA's safety defense may give an analogous, although less powerful, quasi-parens
patriae power to employers. While such a result may not rise to the level of excluding
the legally incompetent mentally ill from society, it may impermissibly exclude them
from employment. Clearly, the State may do the former; the EEOC, however, must
act responsibly to ensure that an employer may not do the latter. Whileparenspatriae
isjustifiable to involuntarily commit the incompetent mentally ill to an institution, it
is unacceptable as a rationale to involuntarily exclude the competent mentally ill from
employment.
'33 HOUSE EDUC. AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 7, at 74.
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response to the mentally ill,' the paternalism that naturally
follows renders these individuals more susceptible and vulnerable
to discrimination under the risk-to-self standard."3 5  Indeed,
Congress addressed this very concern during the evolution of
the ADA.
13 6
C. Current Guidelines for Safety Defense Interpretation:
The Arline Factors and Reasonable Medical Judgment
The EEOC's broad interpretation of employer risk, manifested
in the risk-to-self-or-others standard, necessitates judicial monitoring
because it symbolizes a retreat from Congress's manifest intent to
empower, rather than to patronize, the disabled.
1. The Arline Factors
The EEOC offers four factors, adopted from the Supreme
Court's decision in School Board of Nassau County v. Arline,1 7 for
an employer to consider when assessing a potential direct threat:
(1) The duration of the risk;
(2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
(3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur; and
(4) The imminence of the potential harm.'
"' See Blanck, supra note 28, at 793 (discussing the Harris Poll findings which
revealed that "public views of 'embarrassment and pity' are common towards persons
with disabilities").
... See Neal, supra note 71, at 508-09 (discussing the paternalistic nature of the
EEOC's risk-to-self standard). It is troubling to contemplate that the existence of
mental impairments in the workplace could be the catalyst for the EEOC's broad
interpretation of risk. The standard of risk adopted by other civil rights legislation,
such as Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17
(1988 & Supp. V 1993), and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967
('ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), is a risk-to-others test. Of
these three antidiscrimination statutes (Title VII, ADEA, and ADA), it is significant
that only the ADA protects against mental impairments and only the ADA invokes a
risk-to-self standard.
13
6 See HOUSE EDUC. AND LABOR REPORT, supra note 7, at 72 (stating that "[iut is
critical that paternalistic concerns for the disabled person's own safety not be used
to disqualify an otherwise qualified applicant").
237 480 U.S. 273, 284-86 (1987) (holding that there was insufficient evidence
to determine if a school teacher with tuberculosis presented a direct threat
of safety, and thus was not otherwise qualified, under § 504 of the Rehabilitation
Act).
'38 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1995); see also supra note 114.
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Arline itself involved a contagious physical disease and not a mental
illness."3 9 Thus, although the case may be applauded for laying
out a four-prong test for direct threat standard interpretation, its
applicability to mental illness is uncertain, and its terms remain
ambiguous.
2. The Reasonable Medical Judgment Standard
The legitimacy of an employer's safety defense revolves around
her prediction of the employee's dangerousness. 140  The EEOC
dictates that the employer must base her direct threat assessment on
"a reasonable medical judgment that relies on the most current
medical knowledge and/or on the best available objective evi-
dence."141 This provision clearly contemplates mental health
experts assessing the dangerousness of a mentally ill individual.1
2
While in theory this guidance is helpful, in practice it may not
suffice to ensure that this evaluation does not incorporate myths,
irrational fears, paternalistic stereotypes, or any subjective beliefs
about the individual or the disability.' Reliance on medical
knowledge is especially difficult in the area of mental illness because
of the irregular and episodic nature of this impairment. Moreover,
139 See 480 U.S. at 276. Arline, a school teacher, suffered from tuberculosis; the
alleged threat she presented to her students was her contagiousness. See id. at 281.
After setting out the test for determining direct threat, the Supreme Court held that
the Rehabilitation Act protected Arline since impairments that "might not diminish
a person's physical or mental capabilities ... could nevertheless substantially limit
that person's ability to work as a result of the negative reactions of others to the
impairment." Id. at 283. Congress significantly cut back the protection of Arline by
stating that a person suffering from a contagious disease will not be considered
handicapped if the disease causes a "direct threat to the health and safety" of others.
29 U.S.C. § 706(8)(D) (Supp. V 1993).
140 Unlike criminal law, which is based on past actions, mental health law evaluates
both past and future actions, especially future. See CURT R. BARTOL, PSYCHOLOGY
AND AMERICAN LAw 100 (1983). It is inescapable that employers will call upon this
subjective element of mental health law in advancing the affirmative safety defense
against the claims of mentally ill individuals.
141 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(r) (1995); see also EEOC, TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE MANUAL,
supra note 25, at IV-5 (requiring strict guidelines for a finding of direct threat such
that it "cannot be based on mere speculation unrelated to the individual in
question").
1
42 See supra note 39 (discussing the role of mental health specialists in disability
law).
1 See BARTOL, supra note 140, at 107 (noting that even psychiatrists and psycholo-
gists are poor at assessing the behavior of the mentally ill and predicting dangerous-
ness, and that often these experts themselves "rely on hunches, speculation, vague
clinical judgment, and theoretical prejudice").
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the definitions and diagnoses of mental illness remain in constant
flux.' If the reasonable judgment standard evolves into a battle of
the experts, a mire of clinical predictions providing little guidance
to employers will result.
If these basic mental health issues are so bedeviling to a practicing
psychiatrist, imagine the variation and complexity of issues facing
employers who will have to address the needs of mentally-disabled
employees, who may run the gamut from a salesman with psycho-
tic delusions, to an assembly line worker with attention deficit
disorder, to a bus driver with panic attack disorder.
145
D. The Need for Stricter Guidelines and
Additional Considerations
The safety defense is "an especially sticky area" for employers
since it requires that the employer "balance concerns about violence
with the mandates of the ADA." 146 The problem with the current
standards is that they do not adequately shield the mentally ill from
the risk that employers will overuse the safety defense with respect
to them. Empirical evidence illustrates that employers embrace the
myths that disabled employees plague the workplace with safety
risks 147 and that those with mental disabilities pose a special
danger. 148
Thus, preceded by their reputation as a dangerous group of
individuals, the claims of the mentally ill are vulnerable to the direct
144 Definitions of mental illness have changed even from the time of the ADA's
enactment. In 1990, when the ADA was passed, Congress relied on the DSM-III-R.
See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS (3d ed. 1987). By 1994, when the ADA was in full effect, the APA had
issued a fourth edition of the manual, DSM-IV. See DSM-IV, supra note 9. Mental
health professionals have noted the difficulties presented by the ambiguous
definitions of mental illness. See, e.g., Yale Kramer, Schizophrenia and Psychiaty's
Limits, WALL ST.J., Mar. 9, 1994, at A12 (stating that ambiguity results from the fact
that the specific causes of mental illness remain unknown).
145 Pechman, supra note 12, at 22.
146 Id. at 26.
"4 See Blanck, supra note 28, at 698 (reporting that research discredits the belief
that disabled employees jeopardize the safety of the workplace).
14 Cf. Peter Margulies, The Cognitive Politics of Professional Conflict: Law Reform,
Mental Health Treatment Technology, and Citizen Self-Governance, 5 HARv.J.L. & TECH.,
Spring 1992, at 25, 34 ("Criminal acts by people with mental disabilities are
memorable while the mundane lives led by most people with mental disabilities melt
into the mainstream."); Zuckerman, supra note 110, at 312 (noting that the myths and
stereotypes surrounding mental illnesses lead employers to conclude that "a mental
illness makes the person unable to interact with others").
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threat defense. By interpreting this defense to have a "risk-to-self"
component, the present EEOC standard justifies an employer's
subjective concern that a mentally ill employee is more likely to
engage in self-mutilation or other self-destructive behavior. 49 The
EEOC has provided a crutch, then, for employers who simply do not
want disabled individuals in their midst.
There are, to be sure, situations in which the safety defense
correctly applies. A clear history of repeated violence substantiated
by previous instances manifesting dangerousness, for example,
would warrant the invocation of the direct threat qualification.
Thus, one court asked: "How many times must violence be
overlooked before a 'reasonable accommodation' has been
achieved?"15 ° The preceding Parts looked at the tests courts have
used to respond to this question. Use of the tests above is not justi-
fied in cases involving the mentally ill, however, since they do not
adequately account for the predominant treatment of the mentally
ill. The present EEOC guidelines wholly ignore the use of medica-
tion to treat the mentally ill as an element of the direct threat
qualification. To achieve the goals of the ADA, the law
must recognize and accommodate the use of psychotropic medica-
tion. Given the widespread and successful use of psychotropic
medication as a method of controlling the symptoms of mental
illness, the absence of this consideration renders the guidelines
incomplete.
14 9 SeeJohn W. Parry, Mental Disabilities Under the ADA: A Difficult Path to Follow,
17 MENTAL & PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 100, 102 (1993) (claiming that "Congress
did not intend to include self-harm under the definition of direct threat"); see also
Albert Rosen, Detection of Suicidal Patients: An Example of Some Limitations in the
Prediction of Infrequent Events, 18 J. CONSULTING PSYCHOL. 397, 401 (1954) (finding
that suicide is an infrequent and largely overpredicted event and that very few
patients who are severely depressed or threaten suicide actually commit the act). But
cf. ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 64 (acknowledging that 15% of persons with
severe depression commit suicide compared to only 1% of the general population).
Other reasons for invoking the defense are also unacceptable, such as increased
insurance costs and fear of potentially costly compensation claims. Cf. Mary T.
Giliberti, The Application of the ADA to Distinctions Based on Mental Disability in
Employer-Provided Health and Long-Term Disability Insurance Plans, 18 MENTAL &
PHYSICAL DISABILITY L. REP. 600, 601-03 (1994) (discussing the impact of the ADA
on insurance plans and arguing that the ADA unfairly permits insurers to put limits
on mental health coverage).
" Franklin v. United States Postal Serv., 687 F. Supp. 1214, 1219 (S.D. Ohio
1988).
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IV. A PROPOSED STANDARD
A. Extending the Arline Factors to Include the Use of
Medication in the Direct Threat Assessment
If left unchecked, the safety defense threatens to swallow the
ADA's goal of inclusion with respect to the mentally ill. Together
with the EEOC, courts must refuse to allow employers to use the
safety defense when it has the effect of ostracizing the mentally ill
and the illegal consequence of unfairly denying them employment.
Thus, this Comment proposes that a fifth factor be added to the
Arline test of direct threat. 5 ' This fifth factor should require
specific consideration of the ameliorative effect of psychotropic
medication on the safety risk in the direct threat analysis. Thus,
only a concrete showing of a history of violence or abuse due to
mental illness that cannot be controlled by psychotropic medicine, which
is practically certain to arise in the workplace, justifies the safety
defense.
By controlling any foreseeable threat to self or others in the
workplace, the use of medication satisfies the concerns underlying
the safety defense. Thus in applying the direct threat standard to
ADA claims by mentally ill employees, courts should look to a five-
factor test:
1) The duration of the risk;
2) The nature and severity of the potential harm;
3) The likelihood that the potential harm will occur;
4) The imminence of the potential harm; and
5) The ameliorative effect of psychotropic medication.
The concerns raised by the use of psychotropic medication in
the workplace render it necessary to look at how an individual's use
of psychotropic medication will be implemented. The individual-
ized inquiry with respect to psychotropic medication is threefold.
First, to what extent can the employer compel a mentally ill
employee to take prescribed psychotropic medication as a condition
of employment? Second, to what extent does the employer have a
duty to accommodate any side effects of medication? Third, and
finally, who will bear the cost of required medication? The
remainder of this analysis is devoted to answering these questions.
. See supra notes 114, 138 and accompanying text (outlining the current four-
factor test).
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B. The Convergence of Medication and Direct Threat
Direct threat and the use of psychotropic medication by a
mentally ill employee came together under the Rehabilitation Act
in Franklin v. United States Postal Service,15 2 a case which consid-
ered the termination of an employee who suffered from paranoid
schizophrenia. Franklin's mental disability was characterized by a
propensity for violence, which she controlled through antipsychotic
medication. The court held that a person who has a mental illness
that is controllable by medication but does not take such medication
is not an "otherwise qualified handicapped person." 15 3  The
court's conclusion, however, has been criticized because the
evidence of potential threat, which included previous incidents of
belligerence, was not work-related.
54
The ADA does not address the proper role of medication in the
workplace. Inevitably, the courts will face the question of whether
an employer can require a mentally ill employee to take prescribed
medication as a condition of employment-a question considered
below. 155
C. The Role of Medication in the Direct Threat Analysis
Mental illness is often treated with psychotropic medication, and
this medication presents a compelling solution for treating and
accommodating a mentally ill employee while reducing any possible
threat both to the individual and to others in the workplace. For
example, lithium might reduce the suicidal tendencies of a bus
driver suffering from severe depression while simultaneously
removing the related threat to the passengers. These medications,
however, are a mixed blessing for the mentally ill since they often
have severe side effects that may exacerbate stigma. 156  The
152 687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
153 Id. at 1218.
"5 See Parry, supra note 149, at 106 (arguing that a more reasonable analysis
would look at the potential for violence as it directly relates to the individual's
behavior as an employee).
155 Indeed, the courts have already considered this issue to a limited extent. See,
e.g., Muller v. Automobile Club, 897 F. Supp. 1289, 1296 (S.D. Cal. 1995) (rejecting
the plaintiff's claim that she had a cognizable disability due to medicinal side effects
because she was no longer on the medication and there was no indication that the
side effects continued); EEOC v. Union Carbide Chems. & Plastics Co., No. CIV.A.94-
103, 1995 WL 495910, at *2 (E.D. La. Aug. 18, 1995) (holding that an employee
suffering from bi-polar (manic depressive) disorder is a qualified individual under the
ADA even though his condition may be controlled by medication).
" Persons suffering from schizophrenia, for instance, experience delusions and
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adverse and significant consequences of such side effects may lead
mentally ill persons to forgo the medication altogether, thereby
directly influencing their performance in the workplace. The
employer has a legitimate interest, then, in the mentally ill
employee's decision regarding the use of psychotropic medication.
A balance between the needs and interests of the employer and the
employee must be struck because an employee who must rely on
medication to function in the workplace "experience[s] directly both
the isolation of mental illness and the intrusiveness of medical
interventions."
157
D. Pros and Cons of Medication in the Workplace
1. Medication Encourages Integration
Recent medical advances contributing to a better understanding
of the interaction between mind and body have markedly increased
the success rate of treating mental illness with psychotropic
drugs. 5 s For the individual, successful treatment with medication
is a release from the symptomatic prison and an integration into the
workforce of America. For the employer, the successful use of
medication signals the diminishment of the undesirable symptoms
of mental disorder within the work environment and is an incentive
encouraging such treatment. A mentally ill employee whose symp-
toms disappear with medication requires fewer "reasonable
accommodations" and can contribute more to the productive
working environment.
2. Medication Imposes Side Effects
The serious side effects accompanying many psychotropic drugs
may outweigh the benefits of such treatment. 59 The double-
edged implications for the employer of a disabled employee are
hallucinations. Drugs, such as haldol, thorazine, and prolixin, which have been used
to treat schizophrenia, result in stigmatizing adverse effects. Among the most grave
and widely cited negative side effects of psychotropic drugs is the onset of tardive
dyskinesia, an irreversible disorder of the central nervous system that causes
involuntary bodily twitching, as well as enlargement and rolling of the tongue. See
Margulies, supra note 148, at 28-29; infra note 161.
157 Id. at 49.
-8 See ZUCKERMAN ET AL., supra note 9, at 67.
... See id. (noting that a mentally ill person may prefer the comfort of known
symptoms, for example, delusions, over the uncertainty of adverse side effects).
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readily apparent. The individual afflicted with schizophrenia who
opts not to take antipsychotic medication to diminish her hallucina-
tions will impose greater needs for accommodation than the
individual relieved of that symptom. The use of psychotropic
medication by an employee, however, forces the employer to
accommodate and consider any side effects of the medication. Side
effects emerge because medications do not cure the individual of
the disorder, but rather control the symptoms by regulating the
body's biological and chemical imbalances.160 While treatable
themselves, through regulation and monitoring of medication levels,
side effects may produce additional conditions that require
employer accommodation.16' Among the most common side
effects that will require reasonable accommodation are: nausea,
headaches, nervousness, blurred vision, sleepiness, dizziness, low
blood pressure, dry mouth, severe thirst, diminished memory, rapid
heartbeat, restlessness, muscle stiffness and spasms, shaking, slowed
movement and speech, and tardive dyskinesia.1
62
E. Implications for Employers Under the Direct Threat Standard
Having considered the pros and cons of including and accom-
modating medication in the safety defense standard, three conclu-
sions, responding to the three questions posed earlier, will inform
the employer's prospective treatment of mentally ill employees.
First, the employer should be able to compel the use of psycho-
tropic medication as a condition of employment where the employee
would otherwise present a direct threat. 163  As in Franklin v.
United States Postal Service,164 where an employee presents a
16' See id. at 11. For the layperson, an analogy may be drawn to aspirin, which
reduces a fever without eradicating the underlying infection. See id.
16 See id. at 68 (evaluating this impact of side effects).
162 See id. at 68-69. Tardive dyskinesia presents a special concern since it affects
15% to 20% of individuals under the extended treatment of antipsychotic medication.
See id. at 69; supra note 156.
16 Of course this Comment does not argue simply that an employer can require
an employee to take medication; even a state cannot impose such intrusion on an
individual. See infra note 165 (discussing the ADA's impact on the controversy
surrounding mandatory medication of the institutionalized mentally ill). Rather, this
Comment seeks to offer/suggest a compromise where the mentally ill person who
seeks employment faces challenges presented by the ADA's safety defense. Allowing
employers to condition employment on proper medication, and then imposing on
employers the burdens of accommodation and cost, the mentally ill are able to enter
the workforce with a significantly lower direct threat obstacle.
16' 687 F. Supp. 1214 (S.D. Ohio 1988).
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practical certainty of threat in the absence of medication, such
treatment may be required.
165
Second, to the extent employers can require the use of medica-
tion as a condition of employment, employers will also be responsi-
ble for accommodating the consequent side effects.
Third, the employer should bear the cost under this direct
threat guideline unless such cost represents an undue burden. High
cost may deter the mentally ill individual from taking prescribed
medication. As the employer inevitably possesses greater financial
resources, a disabled employee can expect the employer to
reimburse the employee for the cost of necessary psychotropic
medication or, in the alternative, to provide health insurance which
covers these medical costs.166 While neither the ADA, nor the
65 This inquiry into the mentally ill individual's use of psychotropic medi-
cation reveals the ADA's far-reaching implications and its potential to create an
impact in areas never contemplated by Congress. The ADA goes beyond its
"breathtaking" civil rights scope to "require [the] rethinking [of] legal doctrines
that have dominated mental disability law and preoccupied the courts for two
decades." Milstein et al., supra note 6, at 1247. Specifically, commentators
have suggested that the ADA casts serious doubt on the state's ability to compel a
psychiatric patient to take prescribed medication against his will. See id. The right
of an institutionalized mentally ill patient to refuse medication has traditionally
invoked a strict Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process analysis. Courts
have oscillated on this issue, producing a somewhat confusing and erratic body of
jurisprudence. See Dennis E. Cichon, The Right to Just Say No: A Historj and
Analysis of the Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Drugs, 53 LA. L. REV. 283, 326-30 (1992)
(discussing cases in which an individual's right to be free from governmental intrusion
has been grounded in substantive due process principles such as personal security and
right to privacy); Brian Shagan, Note, Washington v. Harper: Forced Medication and
Substantive Due Process, 25 CONN. L. REv. 265, 271-73 (1992) (discussing cases in
which courts have found substantive due process rights to refuse antipsychotic
medication). The Eighth Circuit has gone as far as to allow a hospital to force an
inpatient with a mental illness to take psychotherapeutic drugs against his will. See
Dautremont v. Broadlawns Hosp., 827 F.2d 291, 300 (8th Cir. 1987) (upholding the
decision to forcefully administer drugs because the state's legitimate interest in
returning the patient's behavior to a level acceptable to society outweighed the
lawfully committed patient's due process liberty interest).
While state legislatures have been silent on this issue, the ADA implies
congressional disapproval ofsuch medical coercion. Perhaps without even intending
to, the ADA's nondiscriminatory stance may have limited the state's traditionalparens
patriae power over persons with mental illness since "it is hard to conceive of a state
rationale for forcing a competent person with a mental illness to take medication
while permitting a competent patient without a mental illness to retain individual
choice." Milstein et al., supra note 6, at 1247. It would not be surprising if the ADA
informed future litigation concerning the medication rights of institutionalized
mentally ill patients.
" See Parry, supra note 149, at 106. For a critical discussion of the ADA's impact
on health insurance for persons with mental illness, see generally Giliberti, supra note
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EEOC, nor the courts have addressed this issue, this Comment
argues that the employer should provide these benefits, as long as
such a request is "reasonable." What is reasonable for one
employer may present an undue hardship for another; thus, the
answer to the question of whether the employer can bear this cost
will depend on the circumstances of each case.
CONCLUSION
Even as we applaud Congress for the ADA, we "must never
believe our goal has been reached." 67 The passage of the ADA
counters a historical "hierarchy of personhood, with the attributes
of full citizenship vested only in those who satisfy a standard of
mental fitness."16 8 While the ADA sends a message of emancipa-
tion to the mentally ill, the courts must work together with the
EEOC to ensure that disparate application of the ADA does not
thwart its ideals. The employer's responses to perceived threats in
the workplace and the use of psychotropic medication present two
of the greatest challenges for the application of the ADA to the
mentally ill. Although current standards attempt to protect the
mentally ill from unwarranted use of the safety defense, the present
direct threat standards fail. Silence on the issue of psychotropic
medication leaves the EEOC interpretation unfinished, especially if
the current risk-to-self-or-others standard passes judicial muster.
Ultimately, the law must recognize the medical advances that
confront the mentally ill in society. The ADA does not merely
propose legal tolerance of the mentally ill, it envisions their societal
empowerment. In order to protect and empower the mentally ill
and provide employers with useful guidelines regarding their
employment, our standards must reflect an understanding of the
complexity and nuances of the issues presented by the safety
defense.
149 (arguing for revision in the EEOC's health insurance guidance).
167 Nosek, supra note 32, at 466.
" Steven J. Schwartz, Abolishing Competency As a Construction of Difference: A
Radical Proposal to Promote the Equality of Persons with Disabilities, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV.
867, 868-69 (1993).
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